Female Genital Cutting: Fundamentals, Social Expectations and Change by Bicchieri, Cristina & Marini, Annalisa
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Female Genital Cutting: Fundamentals,
Social Expectations and Change
Cristina Bicchieri and Annalisa Marini
University of Pennsylvania
22 October 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72927/
MPRA Paper No. 72927, posted 11 August 2016 10:15 UTC
1 
 
Female Genital Cutting: Fundamentals, Social Expectations and Change 
 
Cristina Bicchieri and Annalisa Marini* 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
The paper studies the relationship between female genital cutting (FGC) dynamics, beliefs 
and fundamentals across African countries. Results show that social and economic 
conditions are worse in countries where FGC is practiced. However, if we consider the 
dynamics of FGC in those countries, there is no clear link between fundamentals and the 
abandonment of the practice. Instead, we find a significant correlation with social 
expectations and trust. Our findings support the implementation of bottom-up interventions 
aimed at changing social expectations. 
 
The world is rife with collective practices that are harmful, maladaptive and often violate 
fundamental human rights: Child marriage, female genital cutting, honor killing, domestic 
violence and child labor are just a few examples.  Many such practices involve women and girls, 
and a commonly invoked remedy is to guarantee them better access to education, health and 
employment (Toubia and Izett, 1998; Harrison, 1997). We focus here on female genital cutting 
(FGC),1 an old and still common practice that has been extensively studied. All types of female 
circumcision are considered a violation of human rights and, since often the practice involves 
small girls, it is also considered a form of violence against children.2 Many interventions aimed 
to reduce or eliminate female circumcision have been undertaken and are well documented 
(WHO, 2008; Shell-Duncan, 2008; Innocenti Insight, 2010; UNICEF, 2013; Shell-Duncan et al., 
                                                          
*Corresponding authors: Cristina Bicchieri, University of Pennsylvania, 249 S 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA19104, 
UnitedStates. E-mail: cb36@sas.upenn.edu; Annalisa Marini, University of Pennsylvania, 249 S 36th Street, 
Philadelphia, PA19104, United States. E-mail: marinia@sas.upenn.edu 
The authors are grateful to Steven Duraluf and Robert Hinglehart for useful suggestions and insights. This 
publication was made possible through a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this 
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. 
1
 The term “female genital mutilation/cutting” is used by the World Health Organization to indicate “all procedures 
involving partial or total removal of the female external genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for 
non-medical reasons” (WHO, 2008). 
2
 Female circumcision was recognized in 1993 as a human right violation at the World Conference on Human Rights 
and after that various national laws and international resolutions against FGM/C have been adopted. 
 
2 
 
2013). Despite these interventions, though FGC has seen a progressive reduction in many 
countries, it still remains widespread in about 27 African countries, parts of the Middle East, 
pockets of some communities in Australia, the Far East, and immigrant populations in Europe 
and the Americas.  
It is often argued that the causes of variability in the frequency and dynamics of FGC can be 
found in the social, political and economic conditions of the countries in which it is practiced 
(Easton et al., 2003; Williams and Sobiesczyk, 1997). We show that improvements in economic 
and socio-political conditions, though important, are not necessarily associated with a decrease 
or disappearance of FGC, especially when this practice is accompanied by shared social 
expectations.  
Social expectations, be they empirical (what other people do) or normative (what other people 
believe one should do) play a role in supporting FGC.  This may happen because FGC is a well 
established tradition related to gender or group identity, to shared beliefs about beauty, health 
and cleanliness, or is otherwise supported by norms of purity, honor and fidelity. An analysis of 
13 African countries also found that women who have undergone FGC are 40% more likely to 
get married, suggesting that FGC may be a social norm in some communities (Wagner, 2013).  
According to a recent study (UNICEF, 2013), FGC in most cases is either itself a social norm, or 
is supported by other norms and values, i.e., those who practice it have social expectations that 
sustain it.  
This paper provides a comprehensive study of the relationship between economic, political 
and social conditions and FGC stability or change over the period 1989 – 2011 across the 27 
African countries in which FGC is still practiced.3  In the first part of the paper, we present a 
preliminary and general analysis comparing the political and socio-economic conditions of 
African countries where FGC is practiced with those of African countries where it is not 
practiced, in order to check if there are significant differences between the two sets of countries.  
The second part of the paper focuses on FGC dynamics in African countries where it is still 
practiced. We analyze the relation between FGC dynamics across time and the political and 
socio-economic characteristics of the country. We check whether there are differences across 
                                                          
3
 Other authors have analyzed the effect of social interactions of FGC in Egypt (Naguib, 2012). Of those authors that 
have analyzed a larger number of African countries, some have looked at micro-level factors such as reputation and 
identity pressures (Wagner, 2013), others (Bellemare et al., 2015) have used cross-country-year data to explain the 
persistence of FGC in a limited number of African countries. 
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countries that experienced a clear decrease in FGC between 1989 and 2011, and those that were 
stable or experienced only a slight decrease. We also examine the relation between FGC 
dynamics and social expectations about FGC across countries. In the final section of the paper 
we select four countries as representative of these different dynamics over time. In order to 
understand the factors that could explain such differences in FGC dynamics, we analyze the 
socio-economic conditions and the social expectations surrounding the practice.  
A coarse analysis of countries that practice FGC versus countries that do not practice it show 
that countries that practice FGC have a worse overall performance: they have a lower stage of 
development, worse political institutions and worse socio-economic conditions. Such results 
would seem to support the hypothesis that modernization and economic development are 
accompanied by the abandonment of traditional practices such as FGC.  Yet this hypothesis 
should be checked against a finer analysis of FGC dynamics across African countries that still 
practice it.  Among countries where FGC is common, are better socio-political and economic 
conditions leading to a decrease in FGC over time?  Our study shows that there are no univocal 
relationships between FGC dynamics and fundamentals.  Countries with better socio-political-
economic conditions may not experience a substantial decrease of FGC over time.  Instead, trust 
in institutions, active social participation and positive changes in social expectations4 are 
strongly correlated with the weakening of FGC in countries that still practice it.  Note that trust 
in institutions means, among other things, trust in the government and the legal system. Although 
the majority of African countries have prohibited FGC (Shell-Duncan et al., 2013), legal 
intervention is likely to be more successful in societies where laws are perceived as legitimate 
and community-based discussions create an enabling environment supporting the abandonment 
of FGC (Rahman and Toubia, 2000).  Active participation in the community is also important, 
since being active and promoting social participation facilitates exchange of ideas and 
discussions about the consequences of FGC and how to change it (UNICEF, 2013).  Finally, we 
found a very strong and significant relationship between FGC rates and social expectations about 
the practice, which lends credibility to the hypothesis that FGC is still practiced because a) most 
individuals in the community are expected to practice it, and b) because it is generally believed 
that most members of the community support the practice and think it should be continued.  
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 We refer here to “positive changes” in expectations as changes in expectations about the frequency (diminished) 
and approval (lessened) of FGC.  
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Indeed, social interaction regressions show that the importance of social expectations explain 
much of the probability that a woman is circumcised.  The aggregate data we collected on social 
expectations do not allow us to conclude that FGC is always a social norm; however, they 
suggest that the practice is supported by shared values, norms and beliefs that should be studied 
in depth in target communities. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to present a general and comprehensive 
cross-country evidence on the relation between FGC, socio-economic-political data and social 
expectations.  We should however point out that, due to limited data availability,5 most of the 
results of the empirical analysis are qualitative, hence we cannot assess causal relations between 
economic, social and political indicators and FGC dynamics. The correlations we present are 
nonetheless strong and significant and could be used to draw some tentative policy hypotheses.  
In the next section we describe the framework and data of FGC dynamics. In section 2 we 
highlight the differences between African countries where FGC is not practiced and countries 
where it is practiced. Section 3 investigates the differences across African countries that still 
practice FGC, highlighting the importance of the relation between social expectations and FGC 
dynamics. Section 4 presents four cases of countries that experienced different dynamics and 
rates of change. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
1 Framework and Data 
1.1 Framework  
FGC is a general term that indicates various circumcision procedures that differ in both 
invasiveness and health risks. The type of practice varies depending on the place and tradition. 
Several reasons are evoked in support of the practice, ranging from tradition, cultural identity, 
cleanliness and beauty, preservation of virginity, preservation from promiscuity, better marriage 
prospects, even religious requirement (UNPF, 2015).  Different individuals and groups may give 
some but not all and not even most of the above listed reasons.  In groups that still extensively 
practice it, FGC is often so deeply rooted that everybody is expected to adopt it: women must 
undergo FGC to be accepted by their community, and their families must support the practice to 
avoid the negative consequences that befall both the uncut girl and her family. When talking 
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 The time series for FGC are available from the end of the 1980s, limiting the data to the period 1989-2011. 
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about social expectations and sanctions we always refer to individuals, groups or sub-groups that 
adopt FGC. Individual actions and expectations should be contextualized accordingly. It is 
important to note that in any country there may exist groups that practice FGC and groups that 
do not (Boyle, 2002; Dorkenoo, 1994). Many African countries are ethnically diverse, and 
different ethnicities may or may not practice FGC. There is evidence that ethnical 
fractionalization within a country is negatively correlated with FGC rates (Shell-Duncan 2013, 
UNICEF, 2013), and marriages across ethnicities may help in this regard.   
Whether FGC is diagnosed as a traditional custom or a social norm matters to decisions about 
how to intervene in order to curb the practice (Bicchieri, 2016).6 If FGC is a custom based on 
beliefs about health, gender identity or ethnic markers, social expectations play no role in 
supporting the practice. If instead FGC is a social norm, social expectations have an influence on 
actions, and determine whether a practice is or is not followed (Bicchieri, 2006). In a social 
norm, individual preferences are conditional on the expectations about the behavior of a 
reference network (Bicchieri, 2006).7 Individuals’ empirical expectations are always 
complemented by normative ones, i.e. individuals believe that members of their reference 
network think they ought to behave in a particular way, and might ostracize them if they do not. 
For example, if FGC is related to the importance of virginity and fidelity, an uncut girl may be 
seen as a worse marriage prospect, with serious negative consequences for her and her family.  
Sanctions are often necessary when deviations from a particular collective behavior create a 
negative externality, such as with behaviors that signal a group’s identity.  In this case, FGC may 
relate to a tradition that strongly identifies a specific group or ethnicity. Note that for a social 
norm to influence behavior, it is not necessary that the norm is internalized.  In fact, individuals 
may actively dislike the behavior imposed by the norm, but still obey it if their social 
expectations point in that direction.  
The DHS surveys we report measure attitudes, behavior, and the beliefs of women about 
men’s views about continuation of the practice.  To fully assess the presence of social norms, 
surveys should include the target population’s incentivized empirical and normative 
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 A reference network is the group of people who matter to a person’s choices in a specific situation.  Different situations and 
choices may involve different reference networks.   
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expectations, as well as a measure of the influence such expectations have on behavior.8 The 
DHS data however are useful to show, via a social interaction model, that cutting behavior can 
be predicted by the beliefs and social expectations provided by their surveys, thus lending 
credibility to a social norm hypothesis.9  
1.2 The Data 
The data span from 1989 to 2011, the time range for which we have available data on FGC. 
The data are drawn from various data sets. In particular, to obtain time series data for FGC at the 
country level, we used the UNICEF 2013 report, the UNICEF country-specific 2014 reports and 
the DHS data sets. The DHS data sets are collected from several countries, including African 
ones, and contain information on demographics and health status of representative samples of 
women. The DHS surveys also collect information on FGC practiced on mothers and daughters, 
the personal normative beliefs of women about the practice, and women’s normative 
expectations about men’s normative beliefs FGC.10 Not all the waves for each country contain 
information about FGC, so this data set does not allow a full depiction of the situation for each 
country. Also the time span covered by the DHS is not complete: for a few countries we have 
data from the late 1980s or early 1990s’, but for most of the countries we can only track the 
evolution of FGC over the last decade. Thus, in order to recover the needed country-level time 
series observations for FGC dynamics, we use the information provided by the UNICEF country-
specific 2014 reports, and interpolate FGC rates over time. The DHS data on FGC are also used 
in the analysis of beliefs and rates of circumcision for specific countries conducted in the second 
part of the paper.  
When we use survey data, we must acknowledge that, as it is common in surveys, the data 
collected may be subject to no-response bias (i.e., the answer of those who respond may be 
different from those of non-responders) and item no-response (i.e., some respondents choose not 
to answer some questions). While by looking at the survey data we have reason to think that data 
on FGC rates are reliable, other variables may not be. For instance, a woman may not want (and 
often does not) disclose information about her intention to circumcise her daughters and this may 
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 Incentivizing social expectations (for example, rewarding successful ‘guesses’ about what most other group 
members approve of) is a way to diminish experimenter’s effects (Bicchieri and Chavez, 2010). 
9
 DHS data are commonly used in the FGC literature (Hayford, 2005; Bellemare et al., 2015) 
10
 Personal normative beliefs are individual’s beliefs about the value of a practice.  Normative expectations are 
second-order beliefs about the normative beliefs of other people (Bicchieri, 2006) 
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be due to several factors, such as knowledge that FGC is illegally practiced (Jackson et al., 
2003).  Also, when analyzing associations between other variables and FGC rates we cannot 
control for unobserved factors that may affect both: If for instance we want to investigate the 
relation between women social status and circumcision, we cannot control for factors that may 
influence both. However, since we do not have alternative indicators and qualitatively better 
survey data, we use the available data as is commonly done in the literature (Hayford, 2005; 
Bellemare et al., 2015).  
To get a complete picture of the economic, social and political differences across African 
countries that practice FGC and African countries that do not, as well as to analyze correlations 
existing between fundamentals and FGC dynamics, we used indicators from various international 
data sets. From the World Development Indicators (WDI), we selected the following: agriculture 
value added, industry value added, manufacturing value added and services value added as 
percentages of GDP, as well as GDP per capita. These indicators are useful to compare stages of 
development across African countries as well as the relationship, if any, between FGC dynamics 
and economic development across countries that still practice it. From the WDI we also selected 
indicators for female education as well as the presence of female teachers in tertiary education. 
There are several studies that report a negative correlation between women education and FGC 
rates (Orubuloye et al., 2000; Yount 2002), though they are limited to specific countries.  
From the Heritage Foundation (HF), which presents a series of country-specific indicators of 
the level of various freedoms in each country and provides data from 1995 to 2011, we selected 
two indicators: the overall score of economic freedom in a country and the indicator of freedom 
from corruption. The latter is particularly important since we would expect trust in government, 
and enforcement as well as obedience of the law, to be higher in less corrupt countries.  
To check for differences in both civil liberties and political rights, we used the two indicators 
from the Freedom House (FH) data set. We also used the CIRI data set, which collects country-
specific indicators measuring socio-political freedoms. The indicators taken from CIRI are: a 
measure of physical integrity, empowerment rights index, freedom of association and three 
indicators for women economic, political and social rights.  Finally, from the PolityIV data set 
we use the indicators polity2 and polcomp, which measure, respectively, a country level of 
autocracy versus democracy and its degree of political competition. Increasing freedoms and 
rights, as well as democratization processes, are important elements of modernization theories 
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that aim to explain decline in FGC as resulting from greater development (Hayes 1975; Boyle et 
al., 2002; Hayford 2005).11 
There is a difference between perceived and objective freedoms.  Though they should be 
highly correlated, it is important to measure subjective perceptions of freedom, otherwise 
conceived as perceptions of autonomy. Tabellini (2010) points out that, in less developed 
countries, individuals are less autonomous and that this has an effect on productivity. It is 
reasonable to assume that lower autonomy might also affect decisions to abandon traditional 
practices, thus we would expect lower autonomy to be correlated with higher rates of FGC.  To 
check whether differences in perceived individual autonomy exist across the countries under 
study, we collected information from the World Values Survey (WVS) data set. The WVS is 
made with 6 waves covering the years 1981-1984 (Wave 1), 1989-1993 (Wave 2), 1994-1999 
(Wave 3), 1999-2004 (Wave 4), 2005-2009 (Wave 5) and 2010-2014 (Wave 6). Because 
information on FGC is only available since the late 1980s, we only used Waves 2-6. Only South 
Africa and Nigeria are present in waves 2 and 3, and for the majority of countries we have 
information for just the last three waves. Nonetheless, the list of African countries is 
representative of countries with FGC as well as countries without FGC, and this allows a 
comparison across countries.12  
From the WVS, we use the following question to assess individual autonomy: “Some people 
feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that 
what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use a ten point scale in which 1 
means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how much freedom of choice and 
control you have over the ways your life turns out”. For the regression results presented in 
Section 2.2 (Tables 2 and 3) we derive an indicator taking value 1 if the individual chooses a 
point on the scale greater than 5, and 0 otherwise.  
We also used the Afrobarometer to obtain aggregate social indicators and their evolution 
across countries that practice FGC. This data set is made up of 5 rounds and covers the period 
2000-2011/2013. The data are available for some, but not all the countries of interest, and are 
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 Modernization theory argues that when an economy changes from agricultural to industrial or service based, there 
is less family control on individual behavior and greater guarantees of individual rights, as well as more emphasis on 
health. All these changes would create favorable circumstances for the abandonment of female circumcision.  
 
12
 The full list of countries for which data are available is as follows: Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Morocco, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda, Egypt, Tanzania, Ghana, Mali, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Libya and Zimbabwe.   
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often not available for all the five rounds.13 The Afrobarometer contains several questions on 
generalized and personalized trust, trust in institutions, membership in social groups, and views 
about the treatment of women.  We hypothesize that the variables we select may have an impact 
on FGC rates. For example, trust in institutions would mean that, whenever laws against FGC are 
passed and people are aware of them, they would be more likely to obey them.  Group 
participation, too, may be important, as active group participants are more likely to exchange 
ideas and opinions about the practices they engage in, and may be induced to question them 
(Gillespie and Melching, 2010). Needless to say, progressive ideas about gender equality should 
correlate with lower FGC rates.   
As we already mentioned, many African countries comprise different ethnic groups, and this 
fact may have positive consequences on declining FGC rates (Shell-Duncan, 2013; UNICEF, 
2013). The index of ethnic fractionalization we use is taken from Alesina et al. (2003).  
For some of the data sets, especially for the macroeconomic and political data sets, the list of 
African countries is complete, for other data sets (especially survey data), the list of countries is 
large but incomplete.  However, these country lists are representative of countries with FGC as 
well as countries without FGC.  Moreover, the data are also representative of within-county 
differences in the practice of FGC, i.e., countries where the practice is widespread as well as 
countries where the practice is adopted by a minority.  The overall data, across and within 
countries, allows to formulate hypotheses about the drivers of FGC and its dynamics. 
The countries we consider in our analysis as well as the variables, their definition and source 
are listed respectively in Table A1 and Table A2 of the Appendix. 
2 Africa: a Comparison of countries with and without FGC 
In this section we look at differences in the social, political and economic conditions between 
African countries that practice FGC and African countries that do not practice it (according to 
UNICEF classifications in 2013 and 2014 reports). The aim of this section is to check whether 
there exist overall macroeconomic, political and social differences across the two sets of 
countries. If data from the two sets of countries were significantly different, this would constitute 
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 We have information for the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda. This is 
not the complete set of countries where FGC is practiced, but it is a representative sample because it contains 
countries where the practice is widespread as well as countries where the practice is adopted by a minority. 
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preliminary evidence in favor of the importance of development and modernization for the 
abandonment of FGC (Boyle et al., 2002; Hayes, 1975). By comparing these two sets of 
countries we treat those that practice FGC as belonging to the same set, without drawing finer 
distinctions between countries with different rates of FGC. The important differences across 
countries with different prevalence rates of FGC are taken into account in the second part of the 
paper.  
2.1 Macroeconomic and Socio-Political Data 
In Table 1 we report the descriptive statistics for relevant indicators taken from several 
macroeconomic and socio-political data sets for African countries with and without FGC. For 
each pair of mean values for countries that practice and that do not practice FGC we test 
differences in means by using the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test (Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann-
Whitney, 1948), which is similar to the independent samples t-test but more appropriate when 
non-Gaussian distributions are tested. The data show that, overall, countries where FGC is not 
practiced are better off than countries where FGC is a common practice. Countries where FGC is 
practiced have a higher value added as percentage of GDP only for the agricultural sector. This 
indicates that countries with FGC are more rural and less developed than countries with no FGC. 
The indicators for schooling and literacy rate show that in countries where FGC is practiced the 
literacy rate of both young and adult females is lower than in countries with no FGC. The 
literacy rate of young females is higher than the literacy rate of adult females for both sets of 
countries, indicating that literacy of females is growing over time regardless of whether FGC is 
practiced. In addition, for both sets of countries we found a very small percentage of female 
teachers in tertiary education. Once again, the percentage is lower in the countries where FGC is 
adopted.  One might conclude that economic development favors the abandonment of FGC. Yet 
this static analysis does not tell whether - in countries where FGC is prevalent - economic 
development would lead to a decrease of FGC.  This is the important dynamic analysis that we 
provide in section 3. 
With regards to the indicators taken from the Heritage Foundation, Freedom House and the CIRI 
data sets, the countries with or without FGC do not significantly differ in terms of overall 
freedom. However, countries with no FGC have significantly higher rates of freedom from 
corruption. Protection of both civil liberties and political rights is higher in countries without 
FGC (for these indicators lower values indicate higher freedoms) and the averages are 
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significantly different for the two sets of countries (see Appendix A.2 for a description of the 
variables used in Table 1). 
Table 1 here 
The social indicators collected from the CIRI data set indicate that physical integrity, 
empowerment rights, freedom of association and women's political, economic and social rights 
are higher in countries where FGC is not practiced. The result for freedom of association is 
consistent with the findings of the UNICEF report on FGC (UNICEF, 2013), according to which 
FGC is a persistent practice wherever individuals do not talk about it and therefore do not share 
their opinions, nor do they have avenues for meeting and sharing their views.  
Finally, the descriptive statistics for the two indicators collected from the Polity IV data set, a 
measure of the degree of democracy versus autocracy and a measure of political competition 
across the two sets of countries, show that, overall, both countries with and without FGC enjoy a 
low degree of political competition and low levels of democracy. Yet, once again, on average the 
political framework is slightly better for countries where FGC is not practiced than for those 
where FGC is practiced.  
2.2 Autonomy 
The differences in macroeconomic, social and political indicators between the two sets of 
countries are likely to be correlated with individual autonomy. As we already mentioned, 
previous studies show that in less developed countries (e.g. countries with lower GDP per capita 
and lower growth rates) individuals are less autonomous (Tabellini, 2010). It has been pointed 
out that lower degrees of motivation, more passive attitudes and less perceived self-efficacy (all 
variables related to lower autonomy) may lower individual productivity as well as 
macroeconomic performance (Tabellini, 2010; Bavetta and Navarra, 2012). Moreover, higher 
levels of autonomy have been shown to correlate with greater economic development and better 
governance (Tabellini, 2008, 2010).  As we already noted, greater economic, social and political 
development characterize countries that do not practice FGC.   
Our hypothesis is that, wherever autonomy is high, FGC should be low, in that women who 
can freely decide about their lives might be less inclined to follow traditions and feel entitled to 
make choices about their own and their daughters’ bodies (Althaus,1997; Yount, 2002).  We also 
want to test whether FGC is negatively correlated with openness to diversity, and positively 
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correlated with attachment to one’s local community.  Openness to diversity means, among other 
things, the capacity to acknowledge the existence and value of different behaviors and traditions.  
We would expect greater autonomy to be accompanied by greater openness to diversity, and thus 
both should be associated to lower levels of FGC.  Attachment to local community would instead 
be related to higher FGC levels since it might mean that whatever is traditionally done in one’s 
community is highly valued.  In Table 2 we check for the presence of all these correlations.  
In particular, we check whether individuals living in countries with and without FGC 
experience different levels of autonomy,14 whether individual autonomy is correlated with 
generalized trust (trust), whether FGC is more likely to be practiced when attachment to a local 
community (localCommunity) is high and openness to experience or diversity in terms of 
nationality or religion (worldCitizen, trustOtherNation, trustOtherReligion) is low. To examine 
if there are significant correlations between autonomy and indicators for trust and openness, we 
use the WVS data and compare individual autonomy and trust indicators between the African 
countries that practice and those that do not practice FGC.    
 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between individual autonomy (autonomy), the rate 
of FGC (FGC_rate) in the country (equal to 0 for countries that do not practice it, and to the 
actual rate for those that practice it) and other variables capturing trust and openness to diversity 
for each country. The results show that the rate of FGC is negatively and significantly correlated 
with individual autonomy. FGC rates (FGC_rate) are instead positively and significantly 
correlated with the indicators for generalized and personalized trust (trust and trustKnown, 
respectively) and with attachment to the local community (localCommunity). They are negatively 
correlated with openness (i.e., whether one feels to be a citizen of the world and whether one 
trusts individuals from different nations, respectively worldCitizen and trustOtherNation).  
As we hypothesized, individual autonomy is negatively correlated with FGC rates: autonomy 
is higher in more developed countries, and we know that FGC is generally much lower or absent 
in such countries.  Autonomy is usually positively correlated with generalized trust, a correlation 
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 To assess perceived autonomy, we use the variable from the WVS described in the data section 1.2.  
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typical of developed countries (Tabellini, 2010). Yet we see that countries that practice FGC 
have low levels of autonomy and high levels of trust, both generalized and personalized.  This 
negative correlation between autonomy and trust may be due to structural characteristics of the 
country (e.g., more communitarian societies may display high trust and low autonomy; see 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  In countries that practice FGC, we see that individuals do not feel 
they are ‘citizens of the world’, and they do not trust people coming from different countries.  
How does this square with the high rate of generalized trust?  The positive correlation between 
the rate of FGC and generalized trust may be explained by the fact that whenever a society 
follows traditional practices, the belief that most other society members also follow the tradition 
makes them trustworthy (unfortunately, there are no surveys measuring such beliefs). Also 
consider that many areas where FGC is practiced are rural, and people rarely move away from 
their villages. In this case generalized trust may refer to the disposition to trust those one already 
knows. The fact that personalized and generalized trust may be confused in these settings 
demonstrates the need for a refinement of trust indicators (Yamagishi, 2011a,b). On the contrary, 
individuals living in countries with no FGC tend to see themselves as citizens of the world and 
are more open to individuals of other nationalities than people living in a country practicing 
FGC. Those countries, however, are usually characterized by greater urbanization and therefore a 
greater chance of meeting strangers. Interestingly, trust in individuals who practice other 
religions (trustOtherReligion) is positively correlated with FGC; this may be explained by the 
presence of ethnic and religious fractionalization within such countries. 
We next look at differences in the components of individual autonomy between African 
countries that do and do not practice FGC. We want to assess whether living in a country where 
FGC is practiced reduces individual autonomy, and to what extent. We hypothesize, as suggested 
above, that in a country where FGC is practiced there is less individual autonomy due to the 
positive association between economic development (overall higher in countries that do not 
practice FGC) and individual autonomy. Also, given the differences existing across countries 
that practice and do not practice FGC, we expect to find differences in the way regressors 
influence individual autonomy. Finally, we also investigate whether the determinants of women 
autonomy in FGC countries differ from the determinants of autonomy for both men in FGC 
countries and women in countries that do not practice FGC. We have reason to think that there 
are important differences in what determines autonomy because, in countries that practice FGC, 
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women usually perform a more traditional role in the family, and their autonomy might be linked 
to their family role. On the other hand, as suggested by the previous literature (Althaus,1997; 
Yount, 2002), women autonomy in a country that does not practice FGC should be more 
dependent upon the level of education and having a job.  
We now look at the above suggested differences by means of logit models (Table 3). We are 
aware of possible statistical problems (Allison, 1999) in comparing logit coefficients across 
groups so, as suggested by recent work (Triventi, 2013), we use Average Partial Effects to make 
such comparison. All the regressions include both country dummies and time dummies for waves 
2 to 5 (period 1989-2009), leaving the last wave as a reference (years 2010-2014). Thus, we 
estimate the following equation: 
  = 	
 + 	 + 	 +  +  +  (1) 
 
Where  represents individual characteristics (i.e. age, age squared, female gender, dummy 
variables for either compulsory or tertiary level of education as maximum level of education 
obtained, dummies for marital status (i.e. single or married) a dummy indicating whether the 
individual has children, dummies for working status (i.e. full-time, part-time worker or self-
employed) and the size of the city the individual is living in). FGC represents a dummy taking 
value 1 if the individual is living in a country that practices FGC and it is both individual (i) and 
country (c) specific;  indicates country dummies and  represents time dummies. autonomy is 
the dependent variable and  represents the error term, 	
, 	,	 are parameters. 
Model 1 (column 1 in Table 3) analyzes the probability of being an autonomous individual on 
the whole sample of African countries with and without FGC. In order to avoid simultaneity, the 
dummy for the practice of FGC (FGC) is constructed using the period preceding the reference 
wave of the survey. It could be argued that using both the FGC dummy variable and the country 
dummies as regressors could be problematic. However, we estimated the model with and without 
the FGC dummy and we also estimated a model that only accounts for the FGC dummy and 
excludes the country-dummies from the set of regressors. The results are statistically invariant, 
therefore we conclude that both the sign and the significance of the effect of the dummy for FGC 
countries is correctly estimated. 
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The results in Model 1 show that individuals living in countries where FGC is practiced are 
less likely to be autonomous than individuals living in countries where FGC is not practiced. In 
general, individuals with at least some degree of tertiary education are more likely to be 
autonomous than individuals with intermediate education (reference group), while individuals 
with at most a compulsory level of education are significantly less likely to be autonomous than 
individuals with secondary education. Married individuals are more likely to experience a higher 
level of control over their own life than individuals that are neither married nor single (i.e. 
widowed, divorced).  Individuals with a job (either employed full-time, part-time or self-
employed) are overall more likely to be autonomous than individuals belonging to the reference 
category (students, retired, homemakers, unemployed, other). Individuals living in big cities are 
more likely to be autonomous than those living in small cities. Thus Model (1) says that 
individuals living in countries that practice FGC are less autonomous than individuals that live in 
countries where FGC is absent, after controlling for other variables, such as education, having a 
job, etc. 
Models (2) and (3) report the regression results on, respectively, the sample of individuals 
living in a FGC country and individuals living in a country without FGC. Comparing columns 2 
and 3, we observe that in both sets of countries individuals with higher (lower) education are 
significantly more (less) autonomous than individuals with intermediate levels of education (the 
reference group). Also, in both sets of countries, full-time or self-employed workers are more 
autonomous than individuals in the reference group (unemployed, students, retired, etc.).   
There are, however, a few important differences between the two groups of countries. In 
countries without FGC, women are less likely than men to be autonomous, but this is not the case 
in countries with FGC, where there is no significant gender difference in autonomy.  This may 
reflect the important role that women play in the family in more traditional societies. Where FGC 
is present, married individuals (of both sexes) or singles by choice are more autonomous than 
individuals that are widowed or divorced, and this is probably indicative of the importance of 
marital status in these countries.  
Comparing women and men living in FGC countries (columns (4) and (5), respectively), we 
see that working full time increases the autonomy of both men and women.  As one would 
expect, men with higher levels of education (education High) are more autonomous than men 
with intermediate education levels (the reference group).  This is not the case for women: this 
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points to the low importance of higher education for women in these countries, possibly related 
to the difficulty for women to find skilled jobs (Obbe, 1980).  As expected, both men and women 
with only (at most) compulsory education (education Low) are significantly less autonomous 
than individuals with intermediate levels of education (the reference group).  
In FGC practicing countries, women who are married and have children are more autonomous 
than women that, respectively, are widowed/divorced or have no children, but marital and 
parental status do not influence men’s autonomy, highlighting the importance of the traditional 
homemaking role for women.  Overall, the results indicate that individual autonomy of women in 
countries that practice FGC is mainly influenced by their marital and parental condition, while 
higher levels of education and self-employment have a positive and significant impact on men's 
autonomy. This is consistent with the fact that in more traditional societies being unmarried or, if 
married, sterile have negative consequences for women. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Finally, model (6) reports the results for the sample of women living in African countries 
where FGC is not practiced. Comparing these results with those of women living in countries 
that practice FGC (column 4), we see that in non-FGC countries higher levels of women 
education correspond to higher autonomy. Note that, since the percentage of women with higher 
education in no-FGC countries does not largely differ from that of women in countries with 
FGC, we may conclude that the non-significance of the higher education variable (education 
High) for women in FGC countries is not driven by the small percentage of women with higher 
education. Also, in countries without FGC, marital and parental status are not relevant to 
women’s autonomy, unlike what happens in FGC-practicing countries. We may conclude that 
the difference between more traditional countries where FGC is practiced and those that do not 
practice it is reflected in women's role in the family and society.  
In sum, the data show that overall the macroeconomic, social and political conditions of 
countries without FGC are better than those of countries where FGC is practiced, and this seems 
to support the importance of modernization for the elimination of FGC (Boyle et al., 2002). 
Countries without FGC also show a greater level of individual autonomy and a wider set of roles 
women can take in society, which supports the feminist theory (Althaus,1997; Yount, 2002), 
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according to which women circumcision is related to the low social condition of women. When 
women become more independent, FGC loses its importance as a marker of womanhood and 
women can decide what to do with their bodies and the bodies of their daughters. Though our 
data show that more developed countries are less likely to practice FGC, we cannot infer that 
greater development will be accompanied by a reduction of FGC within a country.  In the next 
two sections we show that, within countries that practice FGC, those with better 
economic/social/political conditions do not necessarily have the lowest rate of FGC, nor greater 
success in curbing this practice over time. 
3 FGC Dynamics 
We now focus on African countries where FGC is practiced. Note, again, that we take the data 
on female circumcision from UNICEF 2013 and 2014. These data do not make finer distinctions 
among countries with high or low FGC prevalence.  We want to analyze the dynamics of change 
in all those countries that practice FGC, separating countries in which FGC is practiced by more 
than 50% of the population from countries where FGC prevalence is less that 50%.  We look at 
stability and decrease of FGC over time in all these countries, and seek to establish whether there 
exist significant correlations between fundamentals (i.e. socio-economic-political indicators) and 
FGC dynamics. 
We first look at the relationship between the rate of FGC and fundamentals, although we 
cannot investigate causal relations between such indicators and the practice.  As we mention in 
the Introduction, we have chosen to analyze the relation between a broad set of variables and the 
variable of interest (FGC), to understand which of those are relevant.  We have panel data 
available for the countries of interest, but the absence of many data and complete time-series 
observations for both FGC and some of the indicators make an econometric analysis unsuitable.  
This part of the analysis is aimed at assessing whether FGC is significantly correlated with 
socio-economic-political indicators and the extent to which such correlations qualitatively differ 
across countries characterized by different FGC dynamics over time.  
In Table 4, we group the 27 countries that practice FGC into countries that experienced a 
decrease in the rate of FGC between 1989 and 2011 (column 1), and countries where FGC is 
relatively stable (column 2).  In column 3, we look at FGC rates and socio-economic-political 
indicators in countries in which FGC is practiced by more than 50% of the population over the 
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time span considered.  This part of the analysis can cast some light on the presence of significant 
and consistent relations between macroeconomic, social and political indicators and FGC 
dynamics over time. 
We next present the correlations between FGC changes and further social indicators (Table 5) 
in order to investigate whether FGC changes are correlated with indicators for trust, active and 
passive participation in society, confidence in institutions and beliefs about the presence of 
widespread discrimination towards women across countries. We also test for the existence of a 
negative correlation between ethnic fractionalization and FGC dynamics (Table 6). Indeed, as 
pointed out by the previous literature (UNICEF, 2013), FGC rates are likely to be lower in the 
presence of ethnic fractionalization, since different ethnicities have different customs and 
traditions. While some ethnic groups consider FGC very important, others do not, and the 
possibility of interethnic marriages may facilitate the overall reduction of the practice.  Finally, 
we conclude section 3 by presenting correlations between FGC rates and beliefs about FGC 
using DHS data. 
3.1 Fundamentals and FGC Dynamics 
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the rate of FGC and social, political and 
macroeconomic indicators in countries where FGC has shown a clear decreasing trend (column 
1), and countries where such clear decreasing trend cannot be detected (column 2); we also show 
the correlations for the countries with a prevalence rate equal or higher than 50% over the time 
span considered (column 3), irrespective of the FGC trend.15 This last column highlights the 
relation between FGC dynamics and fundamentals in countries where FGC rates are still quite 
high.16 
 
Table 4 here 
 
The data in table 4 do not allow making generalizations about socio-political-economic 
indicators and the dynamics of FGC.  Though the data partly support the modernization theory, 
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 The available data do not allow a clear-cut distinction, within countries with FGC rates above 50%, between 
decreasing and stable trends.  
16
 Note that indicators for political rights and civil liberties (Political Rights, Civil Liberties) are coded from 1 to 7, 
where 1 represents highest political rights and civil liberties and 7 the lowest. So a positive correlation indicates a 
negative relationship (see the Appendix).  
19 
 
they are by no means conclusive. For example, we see that the higher the service sector value 
added as percentage of GDP, the higher is FGC in all the three groups of countries, and the 
correlation coefficient is large for countries with FGC rates over 50%. Whenever 
industrialization is increasing, FGC is decreasing in both countries with decreasing and relatively 
stable trends of FGC; however, this correlation is positive when we look at countries with a FGC 
rate over 50%.  A large agricultural sector instead negatively correlates with FGC in both 
countries where FGC is decreasing and in countries with FGC rates over 50%, while this 
relationship does not hold for countries where FGC is not clearly decreasing over time. This 
latter result indicates that generally FGC decreases when a country becomes less rural; however, 
column (2) indicates that the result cannot be generalized.  Whenever GDP per capita increases, 
there is a tendency to lower FGC rates in countries with a clear decreasing trend of FGC, but this 
does not happen in countries with relatively stable FGC rates and countries with rates of FGC 
over 50%. This indicates that the economic development of a country is not always associated to 
a decrease in FGC. Finally, especially for countries with relatively stable rates of FGC, when 
women's literacy and their contribution to education as teachers in tertiary education increase, 
rates of FGC decrease; instead, the opposite relation holds between female education and FGC 
dynamics in countries with rates of FGC over 50%.  Thus, although the evidence emerging from 
the correlations between indicators of economic development and FGC may partly support the 
modernization theory, the evidence is not compelling. 
The association between FGC and social rights (see Appendix for definitions) is not univocal 
either. The same can be said for women's social, economic and political rights. There is, 
however, a positive association between political rights and civil liberties for the three sets of 
countries,17 indicating that the more these rights are guaranteed, the lower are FGC rates. Note, 
however, that this association does not reach significance for countries with FGC rates over 50%. 
We also see that living in a democratic country or in a country that guarantees political 
competition is negatively associated with the practice of FGC everywhere, even though not all of 
these relationships are significant for countries with rates of FGC over 50%. This also holds true 
for economic freedom, which is negatively correlated with FGC, but this relationship is not 
significant when we consider countries with FGC rates over 50%. 
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 See footnote 16.  
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Finally, when we consider indicators for generalized and personalized trust, generalized trust 
is negatively correlated with FGC rates in countries where FGC has clearly decreased over time, 
indicating that FGC is lower in the presence of higher generalized trust.  This relation is not 
significant for countries with FGC rates over 50%.  In countries where FGC has not shown a 
clear decrease, the relation between FGC and generalized trust is instead positive and significant.  
This may indicate that in countries with no clear tendency to decrease FGC, the more individuals 
trust their society, the less they put into question its traditions, although further investigations are 
needed.  Personalized trust (trustKnown) is always positively associated to FGC rates, although 
the association only reaches significance in countries with 50% or higher FGC rates. These data 
suggest that the more individuals trust people they know and their network of close relationships, 
the more existing traditions such as FGC can be supported.  
In conclusion, Table 4 shows that while a reduction of FGC is not clearly associated to higher 
economic development or to a higher protection of social rights everywhere, a higher protection 
of political rights and civil liberties, as well as higher economic freedom, political competition 
and democracy are associated to a reduction of FGC, even though many of these relationships 
are not significant for countries with high prevalence rates (50% or more). It is important to 
notice that FGC rates are negatively correlated with women political rights in countries that 
experience relative stability of FGC as well as in countries where FGC rates are over 50%. This 
suggests that guaranteeing women political rights has a significant and positive effect on the 
elimination of practices that negatively affect women lives.   
The above results indicate that, with the exception of a few important variables that have a 
strong and univocal relation with decreasing FGC, the FGC dynamics is not always related to the 
socio-economic development of a country.   
3.2 Are trust and social engagement relevant? 
In Table 5 we report the overall correlation coefficients between the dynamics of FGC and 
(generalized and personalized) trust indicators, trust in institutions (government, police, etc.), 
social participation in one’s community and beliefs about how women are treated in society at 
large.  Unfortunately lack of data prevents us to partition the table into the three groups of Table 
4. However, we can draw interesting conclusions about the dynamics of FGC and their relation 
to trust and social engagement.  
Table 5 here 
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Our hypothesis is that a decline in FGC should be accompanied by a high level of institutional 
trust, especially since in many of the countries we study there are laws banning the practice.  We 
also hypothesize that a decline in FGC should be accompanied by greater active participation in 
one’s community, especially since many interventions to curb the practice take place at 
community level, and being actively involved in community life may help to talk about the 
practice, its value and disadvantages.  Finally, a decrease in FGC should correlate with the 
perception of a better treatment of women in society.18 This latter consideration is consistent 
with Table 4 results, showing that when women political rights are protected, FGC rates are 
lower. 
The first rows of Table 5 tell us that rates of FGC are higher when both generalized and 
personalized trust are higher.  As we already discussed, there is often a confusion, especially in 
rural environments where mobility is limited, between the two types of trust.  Moreover, in 
communitarian societies such as African ones, we would expect the two types of trust to 
coincide.  Rates of FGC are instead lower when trust in government institutions (president, 
parliament, police, courts, electoral commission, local government and ruling party) is higher. In 
particular, the relationship is significant with trust in the court of law, trust in the national 
electoral commission and trust in the ruling party.  This is not surprising, as in most countries 
laws banning FGC have been introduced, and the higher the trust in government, the more likely 
it is that laws are obeyed (Tabellini, 2008).  
It is also noticeable that FGC rates decrease with an increase in social involvement and 
activism (Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005). As we noted, many interventions to curb FGC take 
place at the community level. It is thus reasonable to assume that the higher the participation in 
community activities and collective deliberations, the more likely it is that traditional practices 
will be discussed and, if negatively evaluated, will be abandoned.  
Finally, the stronger the belief that the government is empowering women, the lower the rate 
of FGC. FGC rates instead are higher when women are perceived to be unequally treated by a 
leader, an employer or institutions.  Hence FGC is higher in countries where the perception that 
women receive an unequal treatment is widespread.  Since aggregate perceptions are likely to 
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 We talk of ‘perception’ since indicators such as “women treated unequally by the employer, a leader, the Courts 
or the police”, as well as an indicator of “women empowerment by the government” are based on surveys and 
surveys measure subjective perceptions, not objective data. 
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reflect the objective conditions of women in a country, these data are supported by our previous 
findings about women condition in countries where FGC is prevalent (Section 1). 
In sum, there are strong and meaningful correlations between decrease in the rate of FGC in a 
country and the level of trust in institutions, social participation in one’s community and beliefs 
about how women are treated in society at large. 
3.3 Ethnic Fractionalization and FGC 
Many African countries are characterized by ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003). 
We might expect the relation between FGC and fractionalization to be negative, as different 
ethnic groups usually have different traditions, and FGC might be one of them. Thus we would 
expect FGC to be overall lower in more ethnically heterogeneous countries. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
Table 6 confirms that ethnic fractionalization and FGC rates are negatively correlated, i.e., 
greater ethnic fractionalization corresponds to lower FGC rates. Another reason why 
fractionalization may decrease FGC rates is that, in cases where FGC is not a group identity 
marker (Shell–Duncan et al., 2011), within-country inter-ethnic coexistence may lower FGC 
rates. In Senegal, for example, there can be major variations in FGC prevalence among ethnic 
groups depending on the prevalent ethnicity of the region within which they live (UNPF, 2015).  
3.4   Social Expectations Matter 
The theory that explains FGC as a social norm proper, or as supported by a web of other 
norms and values (such as purity, beauty, fidelity, etc.) relies on the assumption that social 
expectations within a reference group matter to the stability or change of the particular collective 
behavior studied.  Though the surveys we use were not geared toward a specific measurement of 
social norms, they provide evidence about the role that social expectations may play in the 
dynamics of FGC.  The data we use are taken from the DHS, where the women interviewed were 
asked whether they have been circumcised, their own beliefs (attitudes) about this practice, 
whether they believe men want it to continue, and whether FGC is dictated by their religion.  The 
data allow us to say that social expectations – if they are positively correlated to changes in the 
practice – are likely to be important drivers of change.  
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Table 7 presents the correlations existing between FGC rates and aggregate beliefs about FGC 
across practicing countries.  
 
Table 7 here 
 
For each country, we computed yearly averages (for each wave) of each variable to track the 
evolution of beliefs and FGC dynamics over time. Since the data include countries where FGC is 
widespread as well as countries where a minority practices FGC, they are a representative 
sample of the countries practicing FGC.19 The table clearly shows that correlation coefficients 
between the rate of circumcision (circumcision) and the women’s beliefs (i.e., whether FGC 
should continue, if men/husbands want it to continue and whether it is required by religion) are 
large, positive and significant. This result is important because it shows that the actual 
prevalence of FGC is highly correlated with positive beliefs and expectations about the practice. 
Permanence of FGC seems to be strictly related to the existence of beliefs supporting its 
continuation.   
The correlation among the three beliefs is large, positive and strong, indicating that women 
who think that FGC should continue are also likely to think that men in general want FGC to 
continue and/or that FGC is required by religion. In sum, the whole table indicates that personal 
beliefs (attitudes), social expectations and the actual practice of FGC are very highly correlated, 
indicating that FGC may be strongly linked to the social and religious context (Hayford and 
Trinitapoli, 2011). These factors seem to play a much larger role than the social, political and 
economic variables we have analyzed thus far. 
Note that these are country-level averages. Thus these results do not imply that – within a 
country or even a community – there is homogeneity of individual beliefs and expectations. Our 
results support the hypothesis that countries with higher FGC rates should have more favorable 
beliefs (attitudes) and consistent social expectations regarding the practice, and where FGC is 
declining social expectations and attitudes should support the decline.  Using the DHS data, in 
                                                          
19
 In Table 8 the DHS survey data are used for the following countries and years: Benin(2001, 2006), 
Burkina Faso (1998,2003, 2010), Cameron (2004), Central African Republic (1994), Chad (2002), Cote 
d’Ivoire (1994, 1998, 2011), Egypt (1995, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008), Ethiopia (2000, 2005), Ghana (2003), 
Guinea (1999, 2005), Kenya (1998, 2003, 2008), Mali (1995, 2001, 2006), Niger (1998, 2006), Nigeria 
(2003, 2008), Senegal (2005, 2011), Sierra Leone (2008), Sudan (1989), Tanzania (1996, 2005, 2010), 
Uganda (2006, 2011). 
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the next section we estimate a social interactions model to investigate the impact of both social 
expectations and the practice’s frequency on the probability to undergo circumcision.    
4 FGC in four countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal  
We have chosen four countries that vary in FGC dynamics and economic development to 
analyze the relationship existing between FGC dynamics and economic-socio-political 
conditions, as well as the impact of social expectations on FGC dynamics. Our goal is to provide 
examples that may further support the general analysis conducted thus far. 
4.1 FGC and Fundamentals 
Figure 1 summarizes the socio-economic-political conditions of the four countries chosen 
(Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal). Egypt has an extremely high FGC rate, Ethiopia has a 
decreasing rate, Nigeria has a relatively stable rate and Senegal, though having a low starting 
rate, has achieved a significant reduction in areas where the rate was high.  We selected indexes 
that capture economic, social and political freedoms enjoyed by the countries. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Egypt is the country with the highest GDP per capita of the four countries considered,20 
showing that FGC rates do not depend on economic development.  As to socio-political 
indicators, Senegal, followed by Egypt, is the country with the highest average level of overall 
freedom and freedom from corruption, although the graph shows that the trends for the two 
indicators of freedoms are similar across the four countries, and freedom from corruption is 
declining everywhere.  Senegal has the highest average levels of political competition and 
empowerment rights but, again, no path can be detected between the dynamics of these 
indicators and FGC dynamics across the four countries. Ethiopia has relatively low GDP per 
capita, high though unstable values for the empowerment rights index, and freedom scores are 
similar to those in Egypt. Nigeria has experienced an increase of political competition over the 
period, but has an unstable empowerment rights index and high corruption. In conclusion, there 
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 We report the logarithm of the GDP per capita rather than the GDP per capita for the sake of graphical clarity. We also want to recall that high 
civil liberties indicators are associated with lower protection of such rights.  
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is no clear, univocal relationship between FGC dynamics and socioeconomic or political 
fundamentals. 
In all four countries, there have been legal and policy interventions to eliminate FGC. Though 
this is not the place for a detailed analysis of different types of interventions, the available data 
suggest that social interactions and individual expectations about the behavior and beliefs of 
members of one’s reference group are important in deciding whether to continue or abandon 
FGC (Diop and Askew 2009; Gillespie and Melching, 2010; Naguib 2012).  
4.2 Social Interaction Model 
Given the previous findings about the importance of the relation between social 
expectations and FGC rates across countries (Table 7), we estimate a social interaction model, 
using DHS data, on the whole sample of interviewed women in the four countries we chose. The 
model tests the probability of being circumcised as a function of social expectations, and shows 
the importance of both the perceived frequency of a behavior (empirical expectations) and the 
expectation about others’ approval of the practice (normative expectations). We conclude that 
both kinds of expectations play a crucial role in supporting the continuation of FGC.  
Since we want to investigate what are the determinants of women behavior, our dependent 
variable is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the woman has been circumcised and 0 otherwise: 
This distinguishes our regression from previous studies (Bellemare et al., 2015), which use as 
dependent variable the woman’ belief that FGC should continue.  
We estimate the following social interaction model (Brock and Durlauf, 2001): 
  =  +  +  + 
 +  (2) 
 
where  	 is behavior of individual i, that is, whether the woman has been circumcised. This is a 
function of a constant (c), individual characteristics  (represented here by age, age squared, a 
dummy that takes into account whether the woman is living in a rural or urban area, an indicator 
for education level and a dummy variable taking value 1 if the women is of Islamic religion).  
indicates contextual-specific variables, represented here by country dummies.  is the social 
interaction term, and represents the region-specific rate of circumcision and women’s empirical 
expectations about it (assumed to be correct for each i), as well as normative expectations, i.e. 
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the region-specific women’s second-order belief about whether others believe that FGC should 
continue (assumed to be correct for each i). Finally,  is the error term.  
Unfortunately, since data are incomplete, we can control only for a few variables. We assume 
exchangeability of the error terms. Furthermore, as it is conventional in the social interaction 
literature, in order to close the model we assume that individual expectations about average 
behavior, and whether circumcision should continue or not, are obtained on the whole sample 
excluding the interviewed woman. Given the large sample size, the sample average does not 
significantly differ from the averages obtained on the whole sample. This, together with assuming 
individuals’ self-consistency, allows to align individual expectations to the objective probability 
generated by the model.21 Both the average circumcision rates and normative expectations are 
yearly regional averages, for each country and wave.  Regressions contain country dummies. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 8.  
 
Table 8 here 
 
The chosen variables capture the essential features that may influence the likelihood of being 
circumcised.  The estimated model shows that both the regional average rate of circumcision and 
the regional average collective normative expectations about whether circumcision should 
continue have a positive and significant impact on the probability of being circumcised. This 
result supports the findings in Table 7, is valid for all the countries in our sample, and is 
consistent with our regional analyses.  The model also shows that, overall, other variables have 
an impact on circumcision. Older females are slightly more likely to be circumcised. Living in an 
urban area as well as having higher education decrease the probability to be circumcised. 
Furthermore, Muslim women are more likely to be circumcised.   
Since women education may occur after or before circumcision (depending on local customs), 
we did run a regression including education of the head of household rather than a woman 
education.  The merging between the women and the household data sets reduced the available 
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 With regard to endogeneity problems (reflection and self-selection), our non-linear model overcomes the 
reflection problem (Manski 1993; Blume et al. 2011). The self-selection problem is usually a relevant one. However, 
in our case we have seen that individual mobility does not significantly decrease FGC even in immigrant 
communities. More generally, we can say that solving the self-selection problem would not significantly change our 
results.  
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observations, and the reduced number of regions makes it impossible to estimate a model that 
includes both FGC_continue and circumcision, and for this reason we omitted the result. 
However, the education of the head of household had a negative impact on the probability for a 
women being circumcised, and this confirms the importance of education to curb this practice. 
Also, there exist cross-country differences on the influence of such variables on FGC, and we 
show it running separate regressions for each country.  
We estimate separate models for each of the four countries, to check for differences across 
them (results are omitted for space, but are available upon request). Regressions show that the 
impact of age, education and social expectations is similar across countries. Instead, the impact 
of living in an urban area is only positive and significant in Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria, 
indicating that women living in cities are slightly more likely to be circumcised; the opposite is 
true for women in Senegal. Finally, being a Muslim also shows cross-country variability, 
negatively affecting the probability to be circumcised in Nigeria and positively in the other three 
countries.  We may conclude that while the impact of some variables is region and country-
specific, the impact of social expectations is pervasive, positive and significant everywhere. This 
highlights the importance of acting on social expectations to reduce FGC in countries that still 
practice it. 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Female circumcision is a harmful practice that violates the rights of women and children and it 
is mostly illegally performed around the world.  In some communities it may be supported by 
health beliefs or norms of purity and fidelity, in others it may be a necessary prerequisite for 
marriageability; it may represent a traditional custom that signals group identity, or it may mark 
the initiation into womanhood. More research is needed at the local level to assess the drivers of 
FGC. Also, the existing literature shows that law enforcement and interventions are neither 
homogeneous nor equally efficacious across countries. The scarce availability of good data for all the 
countries where FGC is practiced limits the tools of the researcher who wants to investigate the 
causes of different dynamics of FGC across countries that still practice it. Providing a complete 
picture of the relationship between fundamentals and the dynamics of FGC across time is very 
important in order to understand what should be done to end such practice. 
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However, whatever the drivers might be, social expectations seem to play a crucial role in 
supporting the continuation of FGC. This tells us that there are behavioral interdependencies. 
Whether or not such interdependencies signal the presence of a social norm, and what the nature 
of such norm might be (marriageability, honor, purity, group identity, etc.) are beyond the scope 
of this study.   
Our goal has been to present a general analysis of the relation between FGC dynamics and the 
economic, social and political conditions across African countries. The data show that, overall, 
economic/political/social conditions of countries that do not practice FGC are much better than 
those of countries that do, and that individuals living in countries practicing FGC experience a 
lower degree of autonomy than individuals living in countries where FGC is absent.   
When we look closely at the differences across countries that do practice FGC, we find that there 
exists a weak, non-univocal relationship between economic/social/political development and the 
prevalence of FGC.  We also find that prevalence decreases with increasing trust in institutions 
and active social participation. The prevalence of FGC increases with the degree of women 
discrimination, and it is also higher the stronger the social expectations supporting it. Finally, 
though many countries that practice FGC are prevalently Islamic, we found that there is no 
strong link between Islam and female circumcision. Our conclusion is that practices as traditional 
as FGC are not very sensitive to changes in fundamentals.  
The importance of social interactions and social expectations suggest that approaches aimed 
at changing beliefs, attitudes and/or values directly or indirectly involving FGC can be very 
effective in reducing the practice. The attempts made by AMREF in Kenya (AMREF, 2014a,b), 
which proposes alternative rites of passage (ARP) to end FGC and improve the health and 
education of girls, are a good example of such approaches. Mass media (radio and Tv soap 
operas) could also be helpful in changing individual beliefs and attitudes (Bicchieri and 
McNally, 2015; Della Vigna and La Ferrara, 2016; La Ferrara, 2015; La Ferrara et al., 2012). If 
there are interdependencies, these interventions will inevitably also change social expectations, 
reinforcing the effects of social interactions. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: FGC Dynamics and Fundamentals 
 
Source: WDI, CIRI, PolityIV, Freedom House. Years 1989-2011. 
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Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Service Value Added*** 575 43.97 12.64 4.14 82.26 568 48.99 14.41 3.64 87.76
Industry Value Added*** 575 22.01 10.19 1.88 54.97 561 33.17 16.79 5.38 80.59
Manufacture Value Added*** 556 8.75 4.61 0.24 22.30 536 13.24 8.26 1.72 45.67
Agriculture Value Added*** 577 34.80 14.64 3.06 93.98 561 17.76 13.69 1.16 57.22
GDP per capita*** 598 502.69 274.29 50.04 1551.25 587 2592.88 2961.06 143.04 15098.62
Literacy Young Females*** 460 50.17 21.33 6.90 96.06 539 82.16 16.65 30.50 99.83
Literacy Adult Females*** 471 33.45 17.22 2.29 81.04 535 65.97 17.30 18.93 96.72
Tertiary Female Teachers*** 386 12.31 6.77 1.23 43.93 379 24.82 13.10 4.96 55.23
Overall Freedom 412 52.91 6.52 26.00 70.19 405 52.55 10.74 21.40 76.30
Freedom Corruption*** 417 24.37 10.56 7.00 70.00 405 31.19 14.73 10.00 70.00
Political Rights*** 617 5.06 1.59 1.00 7.00 598 4.43 2.04 1.00 7.00
Civil Liberties*** 617 4.73 1.30 2.00 7.00 598 4.24 1.55 1.00 7.00
Physical Integrity*** 598 3.87 1.96 0.00 8.00 563 4.39 2.19 0.00 8.00
Empowerment Rights*** 598 6.58 2.99 0.00 14.00 563 7.47 3.61 0.00 14.00
Freedom Association*** 598 0.77 0.72 0.00 2.00 563 1.00 0.82 0.00 2.00
Women Economic Rights*** 598 0.88 0.50 0.00 2.00 563 1.09 0.52 0.00 3.00
Women Political Rights*** 598 1.72 0.53 0.00 3.00 563 1.92 0.52 0.00 3.00
Women Social Rights*** 596 0.68 0.53 0.00 2.00 563 0.80 0.67 0.00 3.00
Polity2*** 617 -0.92 4.84 -9.00 8.00 552 0.54 6.26 -10.00 10.00
Political Competition*** 596 5.02 2.73 1.00 10.00 552 5.56 3.16 1.00 10.00
Table 1: Fundamentals for African Countries by FGC
Source : World Development Indicators, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, CIRI, PolityIV. Years 1989-2011.
Note : *** indicates ignificance at the 1% according to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney test. 
Freedom House Freedom House
CIRI CIRI
Polity IV Polity IV
FGC NO FGC
World Development Indicators World Development Indicators
Heritage Foundation Freedom Indexes
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Autonomy FGM_rate trust trustKnown localComm worldCitizen trustOtherNations trustOtherReligions
autonomy 1.00***
FGC_rate -0.14*** 1.00***
trust -0.02*** 0.10*** 1.00***
trustKnown 0.00 0.15*** 0.11*** 1.00***
localCommunity 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.04*** 1.00***
worldCitizen 0.07*** -0.13*** 0.01** -0.08*** 0.21*** 1.00***
trustOtherNation 0.07*** -0.03*** 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.04*** 0.13*** 1.00***
trustOtherReligion 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.04*** 0.12*** 0.60*** 1.00***
Note : Correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Table 2: Autonomy, FGC and Social Capital Correlations
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Dependent Variable: Whole FGC NO FGC FGC FGC NO FGC
autonomy Sample Countries Countries Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
age2 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female -0.01 0.01 -0.02***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
education High 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
education Low -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.09***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.012)
single 0.01 0.07*** -0.01 0.12*** 0.01 -0.01
(0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.038) (0.025)
married 0.02* 0.05** 0.01 0.08*** 0.01 0.00
(0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.025) (0.029) (0.021)
child 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05*** -0.01 0.00
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.020) (0.015)
full-time 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
part-time 0.02* 0.02 0.03* 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.026) (0.034) (0.018)
self-employed 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03* 0.04 0.04** -0.00
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.017) (0.022)
CitySize 0.02** -0.00 0.05*** 0.00 -0.02 0.05**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
FGC -0.21***
(0.040)
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log pseudo-Likelihood -17,828.09 -8,464.65 -9,325.68 -4,012.93 -4,417.74 -4,721.86
Observations 31,047 14,653 16,394 6,861 7,792 8,139
Source : UNICEF reports (2014) and World Values Survey. Years 1989-2014.
Table 3: Autonomy across African countries
Note : Estimation Method: Logit. Standard errors are robust to the heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
region. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Decreasing FGC Not Decreasing FGC FGC≥50%
(1) (2) (3)
Variables FGC_rate FGC_rate FGC_rate
FGC_rate 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00***
Service Value Added 0.27*** 0.1412* 0.3536***
Industry Value Added -0.07 -0.0736 0.1992**
Manufacture Value Added -0.03 -0.1448** 0.2551***
Agriculture Value Added -0.19** 0.0159 -0.3390***
GDP per capita -0.21*** 0.0453 0.3834***
Literacy Young Female 0.06 -0.4589*** 0.4482***
Literacy Adult Female 0.03 -0.5487*** 0.2520***
Tertiary Female Teachers -0.10 -0.3792*** 0.4294***
Physical Integrity -0.35*** 0.1362** -0.1141
Empowerment Rights -0.29*** 0.0283 -0.2664***
Freedom Association 0.02 -0.0201 -0.2544***
Women Economic Rights 0.13* 0.1663*** -0.0791
Women Political Rights 0.10 -0.2253*** -0.2460***
Women Social Rights 0.42*** -0.0261 0.0201
Political Rights 0.46*** 0.2024*** 0.0885
Civil Liberties 0.49*** 0.2433*** 0.1173
Polity2 -0.47*** -0.1659*** -0.0722
Political Competition -0.42*** -0.2124*** -0.1274*
Overall Freedom -0.39*** -0.2033*** -0.1001
Freedom Corruption 0.32** -0.0361 0.0628
trust (generalized) -0.72*** 0.4610*** -0.0417
trustKnown (personalized) 0.28 0.1581 0.6346**
Note : Correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Source : UNICEF reports (2014), World Development Indicators, CIRI, PolityIV, Heritage 
Foundation, Freedom House and Afrobarometer.Years 1989-2011.
Table 4:  FGC and Fundamentals by FGC dynamics
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Variables Labels FGC_rate
FGC_rate 1.00***
trust 0.21*
trustKnown 0.10
trustPresident -0.14
trustParliament -0.17
trustPolice -0.15
trustCourt -0.42***
trustElectoralCommission -0.21**
trustLocalGovernment -0.15
trustRulingParty -0.23**
MemberReligiousGroup -0.50***
MemberCommunityDevelopment 0.36***
AttendCommunityMeeting -0.46***
AttendDemo -0.26***
RaiseIssue -0.49***
ContactOfficial -0.32***
ContactInfluential -0.35***
EmpowerWomen -0.52***
WomenTreatedUnequal(Leader) 0.90***
WomenTreatedUnequal(CourtPolice) 0.92***
WomenTreatedUnequal(Employer) 0.66***
Table 5: FGC dynamics, Trust and Women Conditions
Note : correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Source : UNICEF reports (2014) and Afrobarometer. Years
2000-2011.
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Country Variables FGC_rate EthnicFract
FGC_rate 1.00***
EthnicFract         -0.28 1.00***
Table 6: FGC and Ethnic Fractionalization: Correlations
Note : Correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
Source : UNICEF reports (2014), Alesina et al., 2003 and
Afrobarometer. Years 1989-2011.
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circumcision 1.00***
FGC_continue 0.86*** 1.00***
believe_Men_continue 0.91*** 0.98*** 1.00***
FGC_required_Religion 0.90*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 1.00***
trust 0.13 -0.04 -0.30 -0.17 1.00***
trustKnown 0.02 0.12 0.78* 0.38 -0.20 1.00***
Table 7: FGC and Beliefs: Correlations
Note : Correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Source : Demographic Health Surveys with information on FGM/C for available countries and Afrobarometer.Years 
1989-2011.
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Dependent Variable: circumcised
(1) (2)
age 0.01*** (0.001)
age2 -0.00*** (0.000)
urban -0.01*** (0.002)
education -0.02*** (0.001)
FGC_continue 0.03*** (0.007)
circumcision 0.61*** (0.004)
Islam 0.07*** (0.003)
Country Dummies
Log pseudolikelihood
Observations
Table 8: Social Interaction Model
Note : Estimation method: Logit. Column (1) reports the average
partial effects at the mean. Standard errors, in parenthesis, reported in
column (2), are robust to the heteroskedasticity. 
Note : Demographic Health Surveys for Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and
Senegal.
4 countries
Yes
-47,811.91
140,528
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Appendix 
Table A.1 reports the countries object of the analysis, whether FGC is practiced in each 
country and, for countries that practice it, its dynamics. 
Country FGC FGC Dynamics Country FGC
Benin y Decreasing Algeria n
Burkina Faso y Not Decreasing Angola n
Cameroon y Not Decreasing Botswana n
Central African Republic y Decreasing Burundi n
Chad y Not Decreasing Cape Verde n
Cote d'Ivoire y Decreasing Comoros n
Djibouti y Not Decreasing Congo, Dem. Rep. n
Egypt y Not Decreasing Congo, Rep. of n
Eritrea y Decreasing Equatorial Guinea n
Ethiopia y Decreasing Gabon n
Gambia y Not Decreasing Lesotho n
Ghana y Not Decreasing Libya n
Guinea y Not Decreasing Madagascar n
Guinea-Bissau y Not Decreasing Malawi n
Kenya y Decreasing Mauritius n
Liberia y Not Decreasing Morocco n
Mali y Not Decreasing Mozambique n
Mauritania y Not Decreasing Namibia n
Niger y Decreasing Rwanda n
Nigeria y Not Decreasing Sao Tome and Principe n
Senegal y Not Decreasing Seychelles n
Sierra Leone y Not Decreasing South Africa n
Somalia y Not Decreasing Swaziland n
Sudan y Not Decreasing Tunisia n
Tanzania y Decreasing Zambia n
Togo y Decreasing Zimbabwe n
Uganda y Not Decreasing
Note : y indicates that the country practices FGC, n that it does not practice it.
Table A.1: List of Countries
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Table A.2 lists the variables used in the paper, their definition, the source and the variables 
from which they have been obtained. 
Variable Definition Source
circumcised dummy variable taking value 1 if the
woman is circumcised, 0 otherwise
Demographic Health Survey
(DHS), variables (v.): s801,
s802, s901, s902, s821,
g102, fg103, v902, s1001,
s1002, s1003, s229, s521,
s551, s552, g102, s631f
circumcision regional percentage of women that have 
been circumcised
DHS, v.: see circumcised
FGC_continue regional percentage of women that think
that FGC should continue
DHS, v.: fg123, g119, s830,
s916, s631g, s566, s560,
s1012, s1023, s816
FGC_required_Reli
gion
regional percentage of women who think
that FGC is required by religion
DHS, v.: fg122, g118, s1022
believe_Men_contin
ue
regional percentage of women thinking
that men/their husband believe that FGC
should continue
DHS, v.: fg124, s924,
s1024, s817
FGC_rate variable taking value 0 for countries with
no FGC, and the yearly average rate of
FGC for countries practicing FGC
DHS, v.: see circumcised;
UNICEF Reports (2014)
age age of respondent (r hereafter) DHS, v.: v012
age2 age of r squared DHS, v.: see age
urban dummy variable taking value 1 if the r
lives in a city, 0 otherwise
DHS, v.:v025
education education taking values 0-3. 0 if the r has
no education, 3 if the r has a higher
education level
DHS, v.: v106
Islam dummy variable taking value 1 if the r is
Muslim, 0 otherwise
DHS, v.: v130
Service Value 
Added
service value added as percentage of
GDP
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
Industry Value 
Added
industry value added as percentage of
GDP
WDI
Manufacture Value 
Added
manufacture value added as percentage
of GDP
WDI
Agriculture Value 
Added
agriculture value added as percentage of
GDP
WDI
GDP per capita GDP per capita at constant prices in
US$. Base year: 2005
WDI
Table A.2: List of Variables, Definition and Sources
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Variable Definition Source
Literacy Young Females literacy rate of young females (percentage of females aged 15-
24) WDI
Literacy Adult Females literacy rate of adult females (percentage of females aged 15
and above)
WDI
Tertiary Female
Teachers
percentage of females as teachers in tertiary education WDI
Overall Freedom index of overall freedom as average of the ten indexes for
economic freedom scaled 0-100 (100=maximum)
Heritage 
Foundation (HF)
Freedom Corruption index scaled 0-100 (100=maximum). The score is derived
from transparency International's Corruption Perception
Index (CPI), which measures the level of corruption
HF
Political Rights indicator ranging from 1 to 7, 1 represents the most free in
political rights, 7 the least free
Freedom House
Civil Liberties indicator ranging from 1 to 7, 1 represents the most free in
civil liberties, 7 the least free
Freedom House
Polity2 index ranging from -10 to 10. -10 indicates that the country is
strongly autocratic, 10 that the country is strongly democratic
PolityIV
Political Competition index ranging from 1 to 10 (10=highest). It measures political
competition
PolityIV
Physical Integrity index constructed from Torture, Extrajudicial killing, Political
Imprisonment and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0
to 8. 8 means full government respect for these rights.
CIRI
Empowerment Rights index constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic
Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly and
Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination
and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 to 14.
14 means a full government respect for these rights. 
CIRI
Freedom Association it ranges from 0 to 2. 2 means that the rights of citizens to
assemble freely and to associate with other persons in
political parties, trade unions, cultural organizations or other
special interest groups were unrestricted and freely enjoyed
by pratically all citizens in a given year.
CIRI
Women Economic 
Rights
it ranges from 0 to 3. 3 means that all or nearly all of women's
economic rights were guaranteed by law and the government
fully and vigorously enforces these laws in a given year.
CIRI
Women Political Rights it ranges from 0 to 3. 3 means that women's political rights
were guaranteed in both law and practice in a given year. 
CIRI
Women Social Rights it ranges from 0 to 3. 3 means that all or near all of women's
social rights were guaranteed in both law and practice in a
given year. 
CIRI
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Variable Definition Source
trust dummy variable taking value 1 if r thinks that most
of people can be trusted, 0 otherwise. For the
Afrobarometer it is a country average based on the
dummy variable.
World Values
Survey (WVS),
v.: a165;
Afrobarometer 
(Afrob.), v.:
sctrust, q83, q87
trustKnown country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that most of people (s)he knows
can be trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q84b,
WVS, v.:
G007_33_B 
trustPresident country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks the Parliament can be trusted, 0
otherwise
Afrob., v.:
trspre, q43a,
q55a, q49a,
q59a
trustParliament country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if the r thinks that the parliament can be
trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q43b,
q55b, q49b,
q59b
trustPolice country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks the police service can be trusted,
0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: trspol, 
q43b, q55h,
q49g, q59h
trustCourt country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that the Court of Law can be
trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: trscts,
q43j, q55i,
q49h, q59j
trustElectoralCommi
ssion
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that the Electoral Commission can
be trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.:trsnec,
q43c, q55c,
q49c, q59c
trustLocalGovernme
nt
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that Local Government can be
trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q43e,
q55d, q49d,
q59e
trustRulingParty country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that Ruling Party can be trusted, 0
otherwise
Afrob., v.: q43f,
q55e, q49e,
q59f
MemberReligiousGr
oup
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r is a member of a religious group, 0
otherwise
Afrob., v.:
memrel, q24a,
q28a, q22a,
q25a
MemberCommunity
Development
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r is a member of a local self-help
association, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v:
memdev, q24d,
q28d, q22b,
q25b
AttendCommunityM
eeting
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r attends meetings of a group that does
things for the community, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.:
parcom, q25b,
q31a, q23a,
q26a
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Variable Definition Source
AttendDemo country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r has attended a demonstration or protest
march, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: pardem,
q25d, q31c, q23c,
q26d
RaiseIssue dummy variable taking value 1 if r has participated
with others to address an important problem
affecting the community or nation (other than
elections), 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: pariss, q25c, 
q31b, q23b, q26b
ContactOfficial country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r, in the past, has contacted a government
or a political party official about some important
problem or to give them his/her views
Afrob., v.: parctg,
q29b, q29c, q32b,
q32c, q25b, q25c,
q30b, q30c
ContactInfluential country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r, in the past, has contacted an influencial
person, such as church or community leader about
some important problem or to give them his/her
view
Afrob., v.: parcti, q29b,
q29g, q32g, q27c, 
WomenTreatedUne
qual(Employer)
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that women are deserved an
unequal treatment by the empoyer, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q56e
WomenTreatedUne
qual(CourtPolice)
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that women are deserved an
unequal treatment by the court or the police, 0 
Afrob., v.: q56d
WomenTreatedUne
qual(leader)
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that women are deserved an
unequal treatment by a leader, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q56c
EmpowerWomen dummy variable taking value 1 if r thinks that the
present government is handling well with
empowering of women, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q67, q57p,
q65p
EthnicFract index of ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al., 2003
autonomy dummy variable taking value 1 if r's control on
her/his own life is 6 or more on a sclae of 10, 0
otherwise
WVS, v.: a173
localCommunity dummy variable taking value 1 if the r declares (s)he
feels to be citizen of a local community, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: G020
age age of r WVS, v.: X003
age2 age of r squared WVS, v.: see age
worldCitizen dummy variable taking value 1 if the r declares (s)he
feels to be citizen of the world, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: G019
trustOtherNation dummy variable taking value 1 if the r declares (s)he
trust individuals from other nations, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: G007_36_B
trustOtherReligion dummy variable taking value 1 if the r declares (s)he
trust individuals from other religions, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: G007_35_B
education High dummy variable taking value 1 if r has tertiary level
education, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X025
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Variable Definition Source
female dummy variable taking value 1 if r is female, 0
otherwise
WVS, v.: X001
single dummy variable taking value 1 if r is single or never
married, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X007
married dummy variable taking value 1 if r is married or
living together, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X007
child dummy variable taking value 1 if r has children, 0
otherwise
WVS, v.: X011
CitySize dummy variable taking value 1 if r is living in a city
with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X049
full-time dummy variable taking value 1 if r is working full-
time, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X028
part-time dummy variable taking value 1 if r is working part-
time, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X028
self-employed dummy variable taking value 1 if r is self-employed,
0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X028
FGC dummy variable taking value 1 if the country r is
living in practice FGC, 0 otherwise
UNICEF reports, 2013 
and 2014
 
 
 
 
